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Walking on a tightrope: the draft accession agreement and the autonomy of the EU legal
order
by Tobias Lock (t.lock@ucl.ac.uk)*
Abstract
Keywords: EU accession ECHR – autonomy – co-respondent – prior involvement of the ECJ
This contribution measures the first draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the ECHR by the
strict requirements of the autonomy of the EU legal order. It concludes that a review by the ECtHR
would be compatible with the autonomy. However, the procedure before the ECtHR provided for in
the draft agreement raises serious problems. Both the co-respondent mechanism and the prior
involvement of the ECJ are well intended but may not pass the hurdles erected by the ECJ in its case
law on the autonomy.
I. Introduction
The ongoing negotiations on the accession of the European Union (EU) to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) prove to be a difficult task for the
negotiators. Since it involves the unusual occurrence of a supranational organisation signing
up to a sophisticated system of human rights protection, this does not come as a surprise.
Apart from the political difficulties of obtaining the consent of forty-seven signatories to the
Convention and of the EU’s institutions and Member States, the requirements of two very
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different legal orders need to be brought in line. From the point of view of European Union
law, the most prominent obstacle to an integration of the EU into the external supervision
mechanism of the Convention is the autonomy of the EU legal order. From the very start of
the negotiations it has been clear that that autonomy, which is jealously policed by the Court
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), would be a major issue for the negotiators. This
contribution is therefore dedicated to the intricacies which the negotiators, and potentially
the ECJ, face in this respect. It is based on the latest version of a draft agreement published
by the informal working group on accession.1 It contains a critical analysis of the draft with
regard to the autonomy of the EU’s legal order but also makes more general comments on
whether the proposed solutions would be workable.
II. Background: EU Accession to the ECHR
The EU is currently not a party to the ECHR. As a consequence, it is not directly bound by the
human rights guaranteed therein. An accession of the EU to the Convention has been on the
agenda for over thirty years2 , but the technical hurdles to it have only recently been
removed. The ECHR is now explicitly open to an accession by the EU.3 And the new Article 6
(2) TEU gives the EU not only the competence to sign up to it but at the same time places it
under an obligation to do so by stating that ‘the Union shall accede to the ECHR’.
Negotiations between the Council of Europe and the EU commenced promptly in the
summer of 2010.4 An ‘informal working group’ presented a first draft agreement in February
20115 and a revised version in March 20116.
An accession would end the peculiar situation in which the EU finds itself at the
moment. The EU has become a major actor on the international stage and takes pride in its
human rights policy.7 Furthermore, respect for human rights is one of the conditions for EU
1 Revised draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the Convention, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
2 Heribert Golsong, Grundrechtsschutz im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Europäische
Grundrechtezeitschrift 1978, 346; European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the European
Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79.
3 Article 59 (2) ECHR as amended by Protocol 14 to the Convention, which entered into force on 1 June 2010.
4 Council of Europe, press release 545(2010), 7 July 2010; the Council gave the Commission a mandate for
negotiation on 4 June 2010 with negotiation directives (Document 9689/10), which remain classified.
5 CDDH-UE(2011)04.
6 CDDH-UE(2011)06.
7 On the EU’s human rights policy in general cf. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, (Oxford
2004), p. 465.
3membership.8 Thus the fact that the EU itself is not a signatory to any human rights
instrument at the moment seriously undermines its credibility internationally. By signing up
to the ECHR the EU would subject itself to the very standards it requires of others and its
own legitimacy would be enhanced. More importantly, an accession of the EU to the ECHR
would close an important gap in the external control exercised by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR or Human Rights Court or Strasbourg Court). It is well known that
under certain circumstances individuals can hold the Member States of the EU responsible
for violations of the ECHR before the ECtHR. The leading cases in this respect are Matthews
and Bosphorus.9 In Matthews, the Court of Human Rights held that the Convention
generally allowed the Member States to transfer sovereignty onto the EU. But where they
do so, they are responsible to ensure that Convention rights are ‘secured’. This means that
where EU law violates the Convention, an individual can hold a Member State to account.
This stance was generally confirmed in Bosphorus, albeit with a twist. Bosphorus concerned
the impoundment by Irish authorities of an aircraft owned by the National Yugoslav Airline
but operated by a Turkish airline. An EU Regulation aiming at transposing an embargo
against Yugoslavia imposed by the UN Security Council required the impoundment of
Yugoslav aircraft. In its decision, the ECtHR confirmed its holding in Matthews but
introduced an important distinction. While Matthews concerned a violation of the ECHR
contained in EU primary law, the alleged violation in Bosphorus had its origin in a Regulation,
i.e. EU secondary law. The ECtHR went on to state its famous presumption that as long as an
international organisation ‘is considered to protect fundamental rights [...] in a manner
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides’ the
Court would presume that a State has acted in compliance with the Convention where the
state had no discretion in implementing the legal obligations flowing from its membership of
the organisation.10 That presumption is, however, rebuttable if the protection in the
particular case is regarded as ‘manifestly deficient’.11 The ECtHR considered that the human
rights protection offered by the European Union was equivalent to what the Convention
requires. Since Ireland had impounded the aircraft on its territory, the ECtHR had no
8 So-called Copenhagen criteria, cf. Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council 21-22 June 1993 SN
180/1/93 REV 1. The criteria are now contained in Article 49 TEU.
9 Matthews v United Kingdom [GC], no 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I; Bosphorus v Ireland [GC], no 45036/98, ECHR
2005-VI.
10 Bosphorus, paras. 155 and 156.
11 Bosphorus, para. 156.
4difficulty finding that Bosphorus airlines were within its jurisdiction as required by Article 1
ECHR. This case law shows that the Member States can already be held responsible in lieu of
the EU for violations of the Convention which have their origin in EU law. But where the
alleged violation of the Convention did not occur within the jurisdiction of one of the
Member States, the responsibility does not arise. This gap in the external supervision by the
ECtHR became obvious in the case of Connolly.12 Connolly was an employee of the European
Commission who had been made redundant. He instigated labour proceedings before the
Court of First Instance and then appealed to the ECJ. His request to submit written
observations to the Opinion of the ECJ’s Advocate General was denied. This denial, he
argued before the ECtHR, constituted a violation of his right to a fair trial guaranteed by
Article 6 ECHR. The ECtHR distinguished the case from Bosphorus arguing that the
respondent Member States had not intervened any time. Thus the violation did not occur
within their jurisdiction and they could not be held responsible.
The accession by the EU to the ECHR would close this gap in the human rights
protection. It would be possible for an applicant such as Connolly to hold the EU directly
responsible in such cases. Furthermore, the accession would ensure that the case law of the
two European Courts would keep on evolving in step.13 Where the Court of Justice deviates
from the case law of the Court of Human Rights, an applicant would have the opportunity to
challenge this before the ECtHR.
III. The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order
An accession treaty would have to be compatible with the EU’s founding Treaties and will
probably be the subject of an Opinion by the ECJ requested under Article 218 (11) TFEU. The
most prominent obstacle for international agreements is the autonomy of the European
Union’s legal order, which some past draft agreements have failed to pass. The ECJ has had
a chance to flesh out what the autonomy of EU law means in a number of Opinions and
contentious cases. Since the accession will subject the EU’s legal order to an external
scrutiny by the ECtHR, the autonomy of EU law is likely to take centre stage in the accession
12 Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union, no 73274/01, 9 December 2008; confirmed in: Beygo v
46 Member States of the Council of Europe no 36099/06, 16 June 2009; Rambus Inc. v Germany, no 40382/04,
16 June 2009.
13 In the words of former Advocate General Jacobs: ‘The ECJ […] has followed scrupulously the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights`, Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law (Cambridge 2007), pp. 54-55; on past and
current developments cf. Callewaert, “The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a
long way to harmony”, European Human Rights Law Review (2009), 768.
5negotiations and before the ECJ. The following short evaluation of the most important
decisions on autonomy provides the background for the remainder of this contribution.
The ECJ’s case law on autonomy reveals that a distinction needs to be drawn
between two dimensions of that autonomy: an internal dimension, of relevance to the
relationship between the EU’s legal order and the domestic legal orders of the Member
States, and an external dimension dealing with the relationship between the EU legal order
and international law. The former relationship was addressed very early on in the Court’s
case law when it held in the landmark decision of Costa v ENEL that the (then) EEC Treaty
constituted ‘le droit né du traité issu d’une source autonome’ which was later translated into
English as ‘the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law’.14 In that case
the autonomy of the EU’s legal order was employed as an argument for the primacy of EU
law over domestic law. Moreover it meant that its binding force and primacy are not
dependent on the domestic law of the Member States, but flow from the Treaties
themselves.15 It is remarkable that the ECJ did not elaborate on the concept of autonomy by
providing a definition but seemed to take it as given. With regard to an accession of the EU
to the ECHR, the external dimension of autonomy is of greater relevance. Its first mention
can be found in Opinion 1/91 on the first draft agreement on the European Economic Area
(EEA). In that Opinion the ECJ declared the first EEA draft agreement to be incompatible
with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. The ECJ identified three distinct reasons why the
agreement violated the autonomy of EU law.
First, the ECJ criticized the jurisdiction of the EEA Court envisaged by the agreement.
That Court was to have jurisdiction over disputes between the parties to the EEA treaty. The
term ‘party to the treaty’, however, had not been clearly defined since the EEA agreement
was to be concluded as a mixed agreement, i.e. by both the EU and its Member States as
parties. Thus in each of the proceedings before it, the EEA Court would have had to
determine who was the correct ‘party to the agreement’. There were three possibilities: the
EU, a Member State or the EU and the Member States together. This assessment would
have been based on the distribution of responsibility between the EU and its Member States
under EU law. Thus the EEA Court would have had to interpret the EU’s treaties. This would
14 ECJ, Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585 (Costa/ENEL).
15 Pernice, “Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European Law”, in: Maduro/Azoulai (eds.), The Past and
Future of EU Law, (Oxford 2010), p. 47 (48); on the development of the Court’s case law regarding the internal
dimension of autonomy: Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law, (The Hague 2004), pp. 239 et seq.
6have been ‘likely adversely to affect the distribution of responsibilities defined in the
Treaties, and hence the autonomy of EU law’ and consequently the exclusive jurisdiction of
the ECJ.16
The second reason was very much related to the first. The EEA Court would have
been given the jurisdiction to interpret the substantive rules of the EEA agreement. Many of
the provisions in the EEA agreement had the same wording as similar rules in the EEC Treaty
and had been drafted according to them. From the point of view of the autonomy of EU law,
this alone would not have been problematic.17 The ECJ acknowledged that they would not
necessarily have to be interpreted in the same way since the aim and object of the EEA
agreement was different to that of the EU Treaties. While the former was concerned with
free trade and competition in economic relations between the parties, the latter’s objectives
went further by creating a legal order of its own.18 However, it was the intention of the
drafters that the provisions should be interpreted uniformly. Thus, the ECJ concluded, any
interpretation of these identically worded provisions in the EEA Treaty would necessarily
prejudice the interpretation of the provisions of the EU’s Treaties. The ECJ did not consider
it sufficient that the EEA Court was obliged to follow the ECJ’s case law on these provisions
since the agreement only provided for the EEA Court to follow the case law existent on the
day of signature of the EEA agreement. Any new developments in the ECJ’s case law would
not have been included.19
Third, the agreement foresaw a possibility for the domestic courts of the EFTA States
to make a request for a preliminary reference to the ECJ regarding the interpretation of the
EEA agreement. The ECJ held that an agreement concluded by the EU could transfer new
functions on the EU’s institutions. However, the autonomy of EU law meant that such a
transfer could not lead to a de facto amendment of the Treaties. The problem in the case of
the first EEA agreement was that the ECJ’s answers to the requests by the EFTA states’
domestic courts would not have been binding on them. This, the ECJ held, would have
changed the nature of the preliminary reference procedure since under EU law any answer
given by the ECJ binds the domestic court making the reference. Such a change in the
16 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 35.
17 Ibid, para 40.
18 Ibid, paras 14-16.
19 Ibid, paras 41-46; in the eyes of the Court, the problem was even aggravated by the agreement providing for
ECJ judges to sit on the EEA Court.
7nature of the functions of an EU institution could only be brought about by way of Treaty
amendment according to Article 48 TEU.20 In Opinion 1/00 the ECJ took the opportunity to
restate in its own words what the autonomy of EU law meant. It identified the following two
aspects of the external dimension of autonomy:
Preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order requires therefore, first, that the essential
character of the powers of the Community and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered [...]
Second, it requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the rules of the ECAA Agreement
and for resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the exercise
of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of Community law referred to in that
agreement.21
Thus an international court must not interpret the Treaties in an internally binding
fashion. In light of the Opinions rendered, the threshold for this seems to be rather low: it
suffices if there is a danger that an international court prejudices the interpretation of the
Treaties. Furthermore, the EU and its Member States must not circumvent the amendment
procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU by way of an international agreement with third
parties. In Kadi the Court confirmed this to mean that an international agreement equally
could not prejudice the constitutional principles of the Treaties, especially fundamental
rights.22 This conclusion added an additional twist to the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the external
dimension of the EU legal order’s autonomy. An agreement must neither constitute a
hidden amendment to the Treaties nor may it touch upon other constitutional principles in
primary EU law, including fundamental rights, which at the time the Kadi decision was
handed down were only protected as unwritten general principles of EU law. The autonomy
of EU law in its external guise is therefore of a constitutional quality. Similar to its internal
dimension, the external autonomy of the EU legal order means that it is not dependent on
the rules of another legal order, in this case international law.23 EU law is therefore self-
referential.24 It ensures that the Treaties cannot be amended through the backdoor without
sticking to the amendment procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU. Treaty amendments are
only possible in so far as EU law provides for them. Furthermore, it guarantees that the
20 Ibid, para 61.
21 Ibid, paras 12 and 13; this was re-affirmed in the Mox Plant decision, Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland
[2006] ECR I-4635, paras 123 and 124.
22 ECJ, Case C-402/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission [2008]ECR I-6351, para 285.
23 Barents, n 15, 172 and 259.
24 Barents, n 15, 259.
8content of the EU’s internal rules are not determined by the interpretations of an outside
body but only by the EU’s own institutions, most notably the Court of Justice.
The concept’s relevance has again become apparent in the Court’s recent Opinion
1/0925 on the Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court, which the
ECJ declared to be incompatible with the Treaties. The ECJ distinguished the agreement
before it from the agreements in the Opinions discussed above. The Patents Court would
not only have been given jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of an international
agreement but also to interpret EU law26, which the Court had on previous occasions
considered incompatible with the autonomy of EU law. The Court did not regard the built-in
guarantees for the involvement of the ECJ to be sufficient even though they were closely
modelled on the preliminary reference procedure contained in Article 267 TFEU. It based its
arguments mainly on the effect this would have on the courts of the Member States since
under the Patent Agreement they would have been divested of their jurisdiction to decide
disputes on EU patents.27 The agreement envisaged that their jurisdiction should be
replaced by an exclusive jurisdiction of the Patents Court on actions relating to patents28
leaving the national courts only with residual jurisdiction in these matters. This, the ECJ
argued, would also strip them of their powers in relation to the interpretation and
application of EU law.29 While the Patents Court was given the right, and in its guise as an
appeal court the duty, to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ, the ECJ concluded that
there were not sufficient guarantees for its own involvement.30 The ECJ identified the
problem that there was no possibility to enforce the duty to ask the ECJ for a reference. In
contrast, where a national court violates its duty to make a reference to the ECJ, there are
two possibilities to remedy this: either the Commission or another Member State can
instigate infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU.31 Alternatively, an
individual can bring a state liability case against the Member State.32 Since the Patents Court
would have been given jurisdiction to interpret European Union legislation and primary law,
the Court regarded this deprivation of the national courts as a threat to the autonomy of EU
25 Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011, nyr.
26 Ibid, para 77.
27 Ibid, para 64.
28 Article 15 of the draft agreement.
29 Opinion 1/09, of 8 March 2011, nyr, para 89.
30 ibid.
31 ibid, para 87.
32 Ibid, para 86.
9law as it would consequently divest the ECJ of its jurisdiction, too. This Opinion adds a new
dimension to the ECJ’s case law on the autonomy of the EU legal order. Not only does the
Court regard the EU’s own institutions to be protected from being affected by EU
agreements but also institutions of the Member States which carry out obligations under EU
law. The autonomy of the EU’s legal order therefore permeates the national legal orders
and partly incorporates them.
The preceding analysis provides the background for the following discussion. It is
axiomatic that agreements which provide for the jurisdiction of a court outside the EU legal
system are likely to come into conflict with the autonomy of EU law. Since the draft
accession agreement is largely concerned with the procedure before the ECtHR, the
autonomy of EU law will be an issue. This has been foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, which in
Protocol 8 states that the accession treaty ‘shall make provision for preserving the specific
characteristics of the Union and Union law’, which is a reference to the preservation of the
autonomy of EU law. The remainder of this contribution will therefore assess whether the
provisions of the draft accession treaty would pass the hurdle of compatibility with the
autonomy of EU law or whether further safeguards would be required. Furthermore, I will
provide more general comments on the expedience of the proposal.
IV. Autonomy and the accession agreement
The accession of the EU to the ECHR is a rather unusual step in the EU’s treaty practice. One
major difference between the agreements subject to the Opinions discussed above and the
accession treaty is that the accession treaty does not envisage a transfer of the acquis
communautaire to third states. To the contrary, the situation is such that the EU is to join an
established treaty regime, which will lead to a degree of adaptation on part of the EU. The
EU will thus not be the sole dominant party at the negotiating table and might therefore find
it harder to push through all of its wishes.33 All this makes it a truly Herculean task for the
negotiators. They have to devise a draft agreement which satisfies political demands,
improves (or at the very least does not hinder) the protection of human rights and stays
within the strict limits set by the autonomy of the EU legal order.
33 Brandtner likened the situation of the EFTA states in the negotiations of the EEA agreements to that of a
‘powerless audience’ being frustrated by an important actor, Brandtner, “The ‘Drama’ of the EEA”, 3 European
Journal of International Law (1992), 300 (328).
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Since a final accession treaty is not yet available, the following analysis is based on
the revised draft released in March 201134 but also on other official documents available at
the time of writing. These are documents produced by the informal working group,
statements made by experts at a hearing before the European Parliament and documents
produced by other national or EU institutions. I shall address four points. First, findings of
violations by the Court of Human Rights. Second, the possible exclusion of primary law from
the scrutiny of the ECtHR. Third, the co-respondent mechanism to be introduced by the
accession treaty. Fourth, the plan to introduce a procedure to guarantee a prior
involvement of the ECJ.
1. External Control by the Court of Human Rights
After an accession individual applicants will have the opportunity to address applications for
violations of the ECHR directly against the European Union. Such violations can potentially
be found in primary law, in secondary law, in executive actions or omissions and in decisions
of the Union’s courts. The question of concern for this contribution is whether such
applications would be compatible with the autonomy of EU law. Two problems arise. The
first is whether the ECtHR would have to interpret EU law in a binding manner. The second
is whether a pronouncement by the ECtHR that EU legislation was in violation of the
Convention would be compatible with the autonomy of EU law.
When deciding upon an alleged violation of the Convention, the Court of Human
Rights must take relevant domestic law into account. Thus at first glance, there is a danger
of the Court interpreting EU law. However, this is not the case. Just like other international
courts, the ECtHR regards the domestic law of the parties to the Convention as part of the
facts. This is reflected in the case of Huvig where the Court stated:
[I]t is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law […]. It is
therefore not for the Court to express an opinion contrary to theirs […].35
Thus the ECtHR would not undertake a binding interpretation of the content of EU law.
However, de Schutter rightly pointed out that there seem to be instances where the ECtHR
34 CDDH-UE(2011)06.
35 Huvig v France, no 11105/84, Series A no 176-B, para 28.
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cannot merely accept the domestic law of the respondent party before it as facts.36 These
are situations where the Court’s determination of a violation necessarily forces it to assess
provisions of domestic law. For instance, the question whether a remedy is effective
according to Article 13 ECHR necessitates an assessment of certain domestic legal provisions.
The same goes for judgments on whether a restriction of a human right was ‘prescribed by
law’37 or whether someone was deprived of their liberty ‘in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law’38. A recent example of a case where a similar assessment had to be made
on the basis of EU law is the case of Kokkelvisserij.39 Like Connolly, the applicant cooperative
complained that it had not been given the chance to respond to the submissions of the
Advocate General arguing that its right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR had been
infringed. In contrast to Connolly, the ECtHR addressed the substantive question. It
accepted the ECJ’s argument in the preceding case where it had pointed to Article 61 of its
Rules of Procedure, which allows for the reopening of the oral procedure after the Opinion
of the Advocate General has been rendered.40 In view of that provision and an Opinion by
Advocate General Sharpston in another case where she had explicitly referred to the
possibility of reopening the proceedings according to that article41, the Court came to the
conclusion that this was a realistic option. The example shows that the ECtHR occasionally
has to look closely at provisions of domestic law. The autonomy of EU law would however
only be affected if this led to an internally binding determination of their content, which
would not be the case. The ECtHR only decides whether there was a violation of the
Convention in a concrete scenario after proceedings at the domestic level have been
completed. The Court then takes into consideration the relevant national law and the
practice of the domestic courts in interpreting and applying this law. The Court’s take on
this question is reflected in the case of Kemmache:
The Court reiterates that the words "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" essentially refer back
to domestic law; they state the need for compliance with the relevant procedure under that law. However, the
36 de Schutter, “L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: feuille
de route de la négotiation”, 83 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme [2010], 551-552.
37 Cf. Art 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 (2), 11 (2) ECHR.
38 Article 5 ECHR.
39 Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands, no 13645/05, 20 January 2009.
40 ECJ, Case C-127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I-7405; the ECJ’s order
has not been published, but an excerpt appears in the ECtHR’s decision.
41 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement
wallon [2008] ECR I-1683, para 157.
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domestic law must itself be in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or
implied therein. […]
Although it is not normally the Court’s task to review the observance of domestic law by the national
authorities, it is otherwise in relation to matters where, as here, the Convention refers directly back to that
law; for, in such matters, disregard of the domestic law entails breach of the Convention, with the consequence
that the Court can and should exercise a certain power of review. However, the logic of the system of
safeguard established by the Convention sets limits on the scope of this review. It is in the first place for the
national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic law, even in those fields where the
Convention "incorporates" the rules of that law: the national authorities are, in the nature of things,
particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection.42
In a case like this the ECtHR would therefore not be the first court to decide on the
interpretation of domestic law. Its decision cannot prejudice that interpretation since the
decision of the ECtHR is limited to two possible outcomes. Either it accepts the
interpretative practice of a domestic provision by a domestic court as compliant with the
Convention, in which case the Court would not need to interpret the domestic law itself but
merely apply it as a fact. The interpretation of the provision would thus not be affected.
Alternatively, the Court does not accept the domestic practice as sufficient. It could for
instance come to the conclusion that a measure was not prescribed by domestic law or that
there was no effective domestic remedy. The respondent party would then have to
introduce new legislation in order to remove the violation. But it would not perform an
original interpretation of domestic law. In neither scenario would the Court therefore
determine the interpretation of existing domestic law in an internally binding manner. Thus
the possibility of an external review does not endanger the autonomy of EU law.
The other issue regarding the autonomy of EU law would be situations where the
European Court of Human Rights finds a piece of secondary law to have violated the
Convention. Would such a finding be compatible with the autonomy of EU law? After all,
the European Court of Justice has a monopoly on declaring European Union law invalid43 and
any such declaration by an international court would be incompatible with the autonomy of
EU law. However, this is not what the Court of Human Rights would do.44 Its decisions have
no automatic direct effect in the legal orders of the parties to the Convention. This is
evident from the wording of the Convention, which states in Article 46 that the ‘High
Contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to
42 Kemmache v France, no 17621/91, Series A no 296-C.
43 ECJ, Case 314/87 Firma Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, para 15.
44 W v Netherlands, no 20689/08, 20 January 2009. The Court stated: ‘[I]t is not for the Court to rule on the
validity of national laws in the hierarchy of domestic legislation.’
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which they are parties’. The judgments of the ECtHR are of a declaratory nature and only
binding under international law. Their effect in domestic legal orders depends on the
individual parties. Yet as regards the EU’s legal order, the ECJ’s own case law suggests that
the decisions of the ECtHR might become directly applicable. The Court held in Opinion
1/91:
Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own system of courts, including a court with
jurisdiction to settle disputes between the Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result to interpret its
provisions, the decisions of that court will be binding on the Community institutions, including the Court of
Justice.45
This does not mean, however, that the piece of EU legislation considered to be incompatible
with the Convention would be invalid as soon as the ECtHR has spoken. Rather this excerpt
from Opinion 1/91 suggests that the applicant would still need to seek a declaration of
invalidity by the ECJ, which would be bound in its findings by the judgment of the Court of
Human Rights. Alternatively, the other institutions of the EU could of course amend or
revoke the provisions found to be in violation of the ECHR. Under international law, they
would even be bound to do so in order to comply with their obligations under Article 46
ECHR. But this cannot lead to an incompatibility with the autonomy of EU law since the
reason for the receptiveness towards the decisions of the ECtHR lies in the EU’s own
constitution as interpreted by the ECJ and would not be imposed upon it by the accession
treaty. There is a further argument why a finding that an external control of EU actions and
omissions by the Strasbourg Court would be compatible with the autonomy of the EU legal
order. After all, Article 6 (2) TEU explicitly provides for the EU’s accession to the ECHR.
When drafting this provision, the Member States clearly anticipated that by signing up to the
ECHR, the EU would subject itself to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. Since the autonomy of the
EU’s legal order stems from the Treaties, explicit provisions in the Treaties cannot be in
contradiction to it.
2. Exclusion of Primary Law
45 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 39.
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In the discussions around the accession a proposal was made that primary EU law, i.e. mainly
the Treaties, should be excluded from the ECtHR’s review.46 The reason behind it appears to
be that the EU cannot itself amend its own primary law. Therefore, it should not be
responsible for it.47 This proposal does not appear to have been included into the draft
agreement. The revised draft agreement allows only for reservations to be made under its
Article 3 ‘in respect of any particular of the Convention to the extent that any law of the
European Union then in force is not in conformity with the Convention’.48 This would allow
for primary law to be excluded. However, another provision dealing with the so-called co-
respondent mechanism, which is discussed in greater detail below, suggests that such
exclusion is not intended. The provision states that a Member State can be designated as a
co-respondent ‘if it appears that an act or omission underlying the alleged violation could
only have been avoided by the [EU] disregarding an obligation upon it under European Union
law which cannot be modified by its institutions alone.’ This only applies to primary law.
Were a complete exclusion of primary law intended, this provision would be redundant.
But be that as it may, it is submitted here that such exclusion would in fact endanger
the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. If a case were brought to the ECtHR, that Court would
be forced to make an assessment as to whether the violation occurred in the EU’s primary
law (as it did in Matthews) or whether it could be found in secondary law or executive or
judicial action. This assessment would have to be made on the basis of the Treaties. This
means that the ECtHR would have to interpret them in a binding fashion, which would
constitute a violation of the external autonomy of the EU legal order. Thus it would not be
possible to exclude parts of EU law from a review by the ECtHR.
3. The co-respondent mechanism
After an accession by the EU to the ECHR, it will become crucial for an individual applicant to
know who they should hold responsible in the Strasbourg Court for violations of the
Convention originating in EU law. The reason is that it is usually the Member States who
implement European Union law, so that from the point of view of an individual applicant the
46 This seemed to be the opinion of the French government, cf. French Senate, Communication de M. Robert
Badinter sur le mandat de négociation (E 5248) May 25, 2010, at:
http://www.senat.fr/europe/r25052010.html#toc1 (last visited 30 March 2011).
47 Köngeter, “Völkerrechtliche und innerstaatliche Probleme eines Beitritts der Europäischen Union zur EMRK”
in J. Bast (ed), Die Europäische Verfassung, Verfassungen in Europa (Baden-Baden, 2005), pp.230, 245.
48 Revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
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Member State acted. Thus such an applicant might be tempted to hold the Member State
responsible even where that Member State had no discretion when it came to the
implementation of EU law. The Bosphorus case provides an example. Ireland had no
discretion in implementing the EU Regulation which demanded that Yugoslav aircraft should
be impounded. Yet Ireland could be held responsible since her authorities had acted. Had
the EU already been a party to the ECHR, Bosphorus might have chosen to hold the EU
responsible since the alleged violation of its right to property was situated in the Regulation
itself. However, since an applicant in a comparable situation might not be aware of the
intricacies surrounding the implementation of EU law, she might equally hold the Member
States responsible since she had only ever been in contact with that Member State’s
authorities and not with the EU.
Due to this difficulty in locating where exactly the alleged violation of the Convention
happened, the negotiators of the EU’s accession suggest introducing a co-respondent
mechanism.49 This mechanism would allow the EU and a Member State to be joined as co-
respondents so that both could be held responsible for an alleged violation.50 The co-
respondent mechanism would be different to the already existing possibility of naming
multiple respondents from the outset. The working group on accession identified the
difference to lie in the fact that the EU and the Member States are not entirely autonomous
from each other51 and that it would avoid gaps in accountability under the Convention
system.52 The revised draft agreement provides that the mechanism would be triggered in
two situations.53 The first would be where the EU and one or more Member States are held
responsible from the outset. The second situation would occur where either the EU or a
Member State is nominated as the original respondent and a potential co-respondent joins
at a later stage.54 The status of co-respondent would be conferred on a party by decision of
49 This mechanism was first introduced by the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human Rights in its
2002 study on the Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 Addendum2.
50 It is still undecided whether the mechanism should be extended to non-EU Member States in cases where
they apply EU law through separate agreements, cf. CDDH-UE(2011)06, para 7.
51 CDDH-UE(2010)14, Informal Working Group on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, Meeting Report of the
3rd Working Meeting, 22 October 2010, para 9.
52 CDDH-UE(2011), para 37.
53 Article 4 (2-4) of the revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
54 CDDH-UE(2010)16, Informal Working Group on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, Draft Revised Elements
Prepared by the Secretariat on the Introduction of a co-respondent mechanism.
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the Court.55 It is not entirely clear how exactly a co-respondent would be designated. The
explanatory report on the first draft reveals that a party would become co-respondent either
on its own application with leave of the Court or by the Court inviting the co-respondent to
join. Where the Court decides to invite a co-respondent to join, the potential co-respondent
would be free to accept the invitation or not.56 To this author it is not quite clear why this
should be so. It is undisputed that where both are nominated as co-respondents by the
applicant, they have no choice but to partake in the proceedings. There is arguably no
difference in the situation where they are later joined by decision of the Court. As will
become evident later, not compelling the co-respondent to join the proceedings leads to
problems.
At first glance these proposals raise no serious objections with view to the autonomy
of the EU’s legal order. It is particularly noteworthy that the decision to join the EU and a
Member State as co-respondents would not necessitate a determination of the
competences between the EU and the Member States, which would be one possibility of
deciding who is responsible under the Convention.57 In that sense, the co-respondent
mechanism is to be understood as a way of avoiding a situation in which a respondent, say a
Member State, would claim not be responsible for the violation maintaining that the
violation was in the responsibility of the EU, and vice versa. This makes the co-respondent
mechanism a viable tool for avoiding interferences with the autonomy of the EU legal order.
However, this would only be the case if it were made clear that the defendants in such
proceedings would not have a right to raise the defence just mentioned. Such a defence
would for instance be conceivable in a scenario like Bosphorus. If the EU refused to join the
respondent Member State as co-respondent, that Member State should not be able to argue
that responsibility in reality lies with the EU. This implies that the Member States’
responsibility for EU law as expounded in Matthews would in principle have to continue.
Otherwise the ECtHR would be forced to decide who was actually responsible for a violation
of the Convention under EU law. Such an assessment would involve an interpretation of the
Treaties in an internally binding manner and would thus violate the autonomy of the EU’s
55 Article 4 (1) of the revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
56 Cf. Explanatory report to the draft agreement on accession, CDDH-UE(2011)05, paras 45-52.
57 Cf. Lock, “EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg”, European Law Review
(2010), 777.
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legal order.58 Arguably, in some cases such a situation could be avoided.59 Again the
Bosphorus scenario might provide an example. There the situation was relatively clear and
easy to understand. Ireland’s decision to impound the aircraft was based on one legal basis,
which was a directly applicable EU Regulation. Thus there would have been no problem for
the ECtHR to identify the location of the alleged violation without having to interpret EU law.
However, one can conceive of cases where a similar assessment would be very difficult to
make, for instance, the case of an EU Directive, which had been transposed into national
law. A Member State might raise the defence that the alleged violation occurred because it
did not have any discretion in transposing the relevant part of the Directive. If the ECtHR
had to make an assessment of such a situation, it would be forced to interpret the Directive
as to how much discretion was left to the Member State in the concrete case, which would
be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order. In order to avoid this, the draft
should make it clear that such a defence was inadmissible.
According to the revised draft the EU may become co-respondent in proceedings
against a Member State where it appears that the Member State could only have avoided an
alleged violation by disregarding an obligation under EU law60, which presupposes the
existence of a normative conflict. This would only be the case where the Member State had
no discretion in implementing its obligations or where there is discretion, all options would
lead to a conflict with EU obligations. The earlier (first) draft agreement contained the
requirement of a substantive link with EU law61, compared with which the new requirement
is clearer and more certain. However, the new requirement also forces the ECtHR to make
an assessment whether it appears that the respondent could only have avoided a violation
of the Convention by violating an obligation under EU law. In order to make this assessment,
the ECtHR has to define what the obligations of the respondent Member State are under EU
law and whether EU law gave the Member State a degree of discretion, which would have
allowed it to avoid the conflict. This may require quite a detailed interpretation of EU
58 Cf. Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 34.
59 These might be the cases for which the explanatory report on the draft agreement provides that ‘the ECtHR
is free to develop its own practice as regards the allocation of responsibility between respondents’ but at the
same time predicts that the ECtHR would not do so where there would be a risk of assessing the distribution of
competences between the EU and its Member States, CDDH-UE(2011)05, paras 56.
60 Article 4 (1) of the revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
61 Article 4 (1) of the first draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)04.
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primary and secondary law and is therefore potentially in conflict with the autonomy of the
EU legal order.
A related issue would be whether the ECtHR should designate the precise origin of a
violation it has found in proceedings brought against co-respondents. Such designation
would raise the same objection just made: it would potentially involve an interpretation of
EU law. The informal working group seems to be aware of this problem when stating that
the ‘Court would not acquire any power to rule on the distribution of competencies between
the EU and its member states’.62 Nonetheless the working group considers that in some
cases ‘there may be an interest in precisely indicating the origin of the violation’.63 Human
rights organisations have also argued for such determination by the Court of Human
Rights.64 They rightly contend that this would allow for an effective execution of judgments
and swift redress for the applicant. However, it is hard to see how such a demand could be
squared with the need to preserve the autonomy of EU law. Instead of an allocation of
responsibility by the Court of Human Rights, it would make sense to create a mechanism at
EU level for this purpose instead.
Even more problematic cases might arise in connection with alleged violations of the
ECHR by omission. A decision of such a case might involve a determination of who was
under an obligation to act in the concrete case: the Member State or the EU. Such
assessment could only be made on the basis of the division of competence within the EU and
would violate the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. If both EU and Member State are co-
respondents this could be avoided if a defence of not being internally responsible were
impossible. In that sense the discussion is very similar to the discussion on active violations
of the Convention. A proposed amendment to Article 59 ECHR contained in the revised draft
agreement, however, causes concern. It states that ‘nothing in the Convention [...] shall
require the European Union to perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has no
competence’.65 The explanatory report reveals that this provision reflects the requirement
in Art 6 (2) TEU according to which the accession shall not affect the competences of the
62 CDDH-UE(2010)17, Informal Working Group on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, Meeting Report of the
4th Working Meeting, 8 December 2010, para 14.
63 Ibid.
64 Views of the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions to the CDDH-UE Working Group,
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/cddh-ue/CDDH-
UE_EG_NHRI_Submission_9_March_2011.pdf (last visited 30 March 2011).
65 Article 1 (2) of the revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
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EU.66 The danger is, however, that this provision would be invoked as a defence in
proceedings before the ECtHR, which then would have to decide on the allocation of
competences based on the Treaties. This would not in accordance with the autonomy of EU
law and constitutes a weakness in the proposal by the informal working group, which does
not seem to have been addressed yet. It would be better if in case of an omission no such
defence could be raised and if the question were resolved internally by the EU and its
institutions, most notably the ECJ. For this very reason, it is not necessary to include this
provision into the agreement since an internal resolution of a violation of the Convention
would have to be in accordance with Article 6 (2) ECHR anyway.
It follows from the above discussion that in order to comply with the requirements of
the autonomy of EU law, the current legal situation whereby a Member State is generally
held responsible for all actions and omissions associated with the implementation of its
obligations under EU law would have to be retained. Neither the drafters nor the ECtHR
should accept a defence raised by a Member State arguing that it had only acted in strict
compliance with its obligations under EU law and was therefore not responsible.
Furthermore, giving the ECtHR jurisdiction to define the obligations of the Member States
under EU law as a preliminary requirement for the applicability of the co-respondent
mechanism constitutes a violation of the autonomy of EU law. It is therefore suggested that
the co-respondent mechanism should be re-defined. A co-respondent should only be joined
to the proceedings at the request of the original respondent. In that case it would be the
original respondent’s responsibility to assess the situation. It would arguably be best placed
to do so since in preparing a defence for its case it would have to consider whether the true
responsibility for the violation lies with the EU or within its own jurisdiction. Should the
designated co-respondent object to its involvement, it would have to do so under EU law but
it should be impossible to raise an objection before the ECtHR. This solution would avoid an
interpretation of EU law and an analysis of exact responsibilities of the Member States under
the Treaties and would therefore help preserve the autonomy of EU law.
4. Prior involvement of the ECJ
As has been demonstrated, despite the envisaged co-respondent mechanism the Member
States would remain responsible for violations originating in EU law. The main difference to
66 CDDH-UE(2011)05, para 26.
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the situation pre-accession would be that the EU could also be held responsible, be it as the
sole respondent or as a co-respondent alongside one or more Member States. Where the
EU is held responsible as a sole respondent, the only domestic remedy available to an
individual at EU level is the procedure found in Article 263 (4) TFEU. Thus an applicant
would have to go down that route in order to satisfy the requirement of Article 35 (1) ECHR
according to which she must exhaust all domestic remedies and file the application within six
months of the final decision.
Where the applicant chooses to hold a Member State responsible, the remedy to be
exhausted is found in that Member State’s legal order. Since the Member States implement
the bulk of European Union legislation, an applicant will normally choose to take legal action
in that Member State. There are two main reasons for this. First, the applicant may not be
aware that the Member State’s action was based on EU legislation and therefore may not be
aware of the choice he has. Second, it may be tactically wiser to hold the Member State
responsible since the national courts (and eventually the ECtHR) would also review whether
the implementing actions of the Member State’s authorities were in accordance with the
Convention. Thus the ECtHR would not be restricted to examine the legal basis only, which
would be the case if the application were directed against the EU.
Where the Member State is designated as the respondent, the problem arises that
the ECJ may not have made any decision as to the compatibility of the EU legislative act with
fundamental rights and would thus not have been given the chance to remedy the violation.
This is because the only way of involving the ECJ would have been through the preliminary
reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU. Of course, Member State courts are under an
obligation to make such a reference either if they are a court of last instance67 or where they
are convinced that a piece of EU legislation is invalid.68 But there is no guarantee for the
applicant that a reference is actually made and they cannot enforce the obligation. A
domestic court may fail to refer a case either because it was not aware of the duty under
Article 267 TFEU or because it came to the conclusion that one of the exceptions to the duty
to make a reference applied. Such exceptions are found in the ECJ’s CILFIT decision.
According to that decision a national court of last instance need not make a reference where
the question raised is irrelevant to the outcome of the case, where the EU law provision has
67 Article 267 (3) TFEU.
68 ECJ, Case 314/85 Firma Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, para 15.
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already been interpreted by the ECJ (acte éclairé) or where the correct application of EU law
is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte claire).69
For such cases it has been suggested by a number of contributors to the recent
discussion on accession that there would have to be a mechanism to involve the ECJ after
proceedings before the ECtHR have been instigated. In a joint communication, the
presidents of the ECJ and the ECtHR stated:
In order that the principle of subsidiarity may be respected also in that situation, a procedure should be put in
place, in connection with the accession of the EU to the Convention, which is flexible and would ensure that
the CJEU may carry out an internal review before the ECHR carries out external review.70
Proposals on how to ensure a prior internal review include a preliminary reference by the
ECtHR to the ECJ71, an involvement of the ECJ by means of an opinion72, a right of the
Commission to instigate proceedings before the ECJ while proceedings before the ECtHR are
temporarily suspended73 and even a preliminary reference from the ECJ to the ECtHR in lieu
of the individual application74.
Before addressing the proposal contained in the revised draft agreement, an initial
question should be answered: is such involvement required in order to preserve the
autonomy of EU law? This would be so if the ECtHR were given jurisdiction to interpret the
Treaties in a binding fashion in the absence of a procedure ensuring the prior involvement of
69 ECJ, Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, para 21.
70 Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, available at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/02164A4C-0B63-44C3-80C7-
FC594EE16297/0/2011Communication_CEDHCJUE_EN.pdf (last visited 30 March 2011); a similar argument had
previously been made by the ECJ: Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on
certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at:
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en.pdf (last visited 30 March
2011); the (classified) negotiation directives issued by the Council of the EU also contain a reference to it, which
can be found in a working document from the EU Commission, Document Number DS 1930/10.
71 R. Badinter, Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de
l’Homme, French Senate, available at: http://www.senat.fr/europe/r25052010.html#toc1 (last visited 30
March 2011).
72 Informal Working Group on accession, Draft additional elements prepared by the Secretariat on procedural
means guaranteeing the prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the EU in cases in which it has not been
able to pronounce on compatibility of an EU act with fundamental rights, CDDH-UE(2011)02.
73 (former) ECJ Judge Timmermans made that proposal at a hearing before the European Parliament’s
Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 18 March 2010, available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/eventsCom.do?language=EN&body=AFCO (last visited
30 March 2011).
74 Steering Committee for Human Rights, Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 Addendum2 paras 75-77.
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the ECJ. As explained above, this would not be the case. A finding by the ECtHR of a
violation of the Convention would not directly lead to an invalidation of the EU act in
question. Therefore, the involvement of the ECJ is not required in order to preserve the
autonomy of EU law.
There is, however, a danger that the introduction of such a mechanism could itself be
incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order as it might constitute a hidden
amendment to the Treaties. Opinion 1/91 showed that a Union agreement may provide the
Union’s institutions with new functions. However, it must not change the nature of their
function. This means that the ECJ must not be given a role which it currently does not have
under the Treaties. If the mechanism foresaw a new procedure before the ECJ, which would
not be based upon one of the currently existing procedures, the autonomy of the EU legal
order could consequently be violated. This would certainly be the case if a procedure were
introduced which allowed for a preliminary reference from the ECJ to the ECtHR since the
ECJ does not normally make such references.
In light of Opinion 1/09 enabling the ECtHR to make a preliminary reference to the
ECJ provided might also prove problematic. It is recalled that the ECJ regarded the existence
of a possibility of enforcing the duty to make a reference indispensable.75 This hurdle would
be hard to overcome since the ECtHR is a court operating outside the EU’s legal system and
outside the reach of the infringement procedures under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU.
However, since the prior involvement of the ECJ is not necessitated by the autonomy of EU
law, the enforceability of a duty on part of the ECtHR would not be of relevance. This is the
difference to the situation in Opinion 1/09. Moreover, considering that the ECtHR would not
interpret EU law but merely treat it as part of the facts, it appears that such a mechanism,
albeit permissible, would have little point.
The informal working group on accession also considered the question of a prior
involvement of the ECJ and generally seemed to be in agreement that in cases where the EU
is a co-respondent and where the Court of Justice has not yet had an opportunity to rule on
75 Opinion 1/09, of 8 March 2011, nyr, para 89.
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the conformity with fundamental rights of the EU act in question, there should be such
involvement.76 It came up with the following draft provision:
Where the European Union is a co-respondent to the proceedings and where the Court of Justice of the
European Union has not yet ruled on whether the act of the European Union [...] conforms with the
fundamental rights at issue, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have the opportunity to do so
[prior to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on the merits of the case // during the
examination of the case before the European Court of Human Rights]. The European Union shall ensure that
such ruling is delivered quickly so that the proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights are not
unduly delayed. The procedure of the European Court of Human Rights shall take into account the proceedings
before the Court of Justice of the European Union.77
It is noteworthy that the procedure only applies to the ECJ and not to the courts of Member
States where a Member State is a co-respondent. The question is why the informal working
group does not foresee the prior involvement of those courts. It is submitted that such
involvement would not be necessary. Where the EU is the original respondent, the applicant
would have exhausted his domestic remedies in the EU courts. The complaint would
therefore be limited to a violation of the applicant’s rights by EU actions or omissions and
not by the law of the Member States. For such cases an involvement of the national courts
would not be necessary since they do not have jurisdiction over the validity of EU measures.
However, the main reason for the involvement of Member States as co-respondents would
be violations found in primary law.78 In such cases all (currently) twenty-seven Member
States would be equally responsible for the violation and could thus be invited as co-
respondents. Some highest courts of the Member States claim jurisdiction over the
compatibility of the Treaties with their national constitutional requirements, so that a prior
involvement of these courts would be possible.79 Yet there are good reasons not to involve
them in the same manner as the ECJ. First, there is the practical dimension: if twenty-seven
highest courts had to deliver an opinion on the matter before the ECtHR could decide the
case, the complaint would remain unresolved for a very long time. Second, the introduction
of such a procedure would be an implicit acknowledgement of the superiority of national
constitutional law over the Treaties, thereby contradicting the ECJ’s case law on the primacy
of EU law.80 Third, one main reason for the ECJ’s prior involvement is to give the EU a
76 Meeting report, 5th working meeting of the informal working group, CDDH-UE(2011)03.
77 Article 4 (6) of the revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06.
78 Supra.
79 Most famously the German Federal Constitutional Court, cf. its latest decisions on the Lisbon Treaty (30 June
2009), joined cases 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09 and in
the Honeywell case 2 BvR 2661/06 (10 July 2010).
80 Case 6/64 Costa/ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125.
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chance to solve the issue internally without the embarrassment of being reprimanded by an
external institution. This would not be avoided if one of the highest national courts were to
find an infringement. Therefore, there are good reasons not to introduce a similar prior
involvement of national courts.
The draft raises three main questions: (1) What are the circumstances which trigger
the procedure? (2) What would be the procedure before the Court of Justice? (3) And
finally, what would be the consequence of a decision by the ECJ?
a. Circumstances which trigger the procedure
The procedure is limited to cases in which the EU is a co-respondent. Where the EU is the
main respondent, such a procedure would not be necessary since the remedies to be
exhausted are those before the ECJ. Yet the proposal makes no allowance for an
involvement of the ECJ in the unlikely situation in which the EU decides not to join the
proceedings as a co-respondent even where the case raises issues of EU law. This would
mean that there would be no prior pronouncement by the ECJ while the ECtHR might find
that EU legislation has violated the Convention. But it would be wrong to regard this as a
deficit in the procedure on the prior involvement of the ECJ. Rather it is a consequence of
the EU’s freedom to choose whether it wishes to join proceedings as a co-respondent.81
Arguably, if the EU chooses not to join the proceedings, it implicitly waives its right to have
the EU measure reviewed internally.
Turning to more substantive questions, one practical issue arising from the draft is
whether the ECtHR would have to formally request the ECJ to make a ruling or whether the
EU’s institutions would decide independently of the ECtHR. The wording of the draft is open
in this respect in that it only speaks of the ECJ being given the opportunity to rule. It is not
entirely clear whether a formal court order by the ECtHR would be needed in order to give
the ECJ the opportunity to make a pronouncement. From the point of view of the
Convention, the EU’s institutions (including the ECJ) are free to examine the validity of EU
legislation at any time. Thus the first sentence of the draft would not have an independent
meaning if it were only to be read as a re-statement of the ECJ’s competence to review EU
legislation. But it is unlikely that this was the intention of the drafters. It is therefore
81 Cf. the criticism voiced supra.
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suggested to regard it at least as an internal instruction to the ECtHR to allow time for the
ECJ to decide. This would require the ECtHR to at least inform the parties that it would give
the ECJ such an opportunity. Further support for this argument can be found in the third
sentence, which attaches legal consequences to the involvement of the ECJ by providing that
that the procedure before the ECtHR must take into account the proceedings before the ECJ.
It seems that this consequence must be triggered by a decision of the ECtHR to give the ECJ
the opportunity to make a ruling.
But the question remains under which circumstances the ECtHR should make such a
decision. It is clear from the wording of the draft that this should either be the case before
the ECtHR addresses the merits or while the ECtHR examines the case. This implies that the
ECJ would only get involved where the ECtHR has found the case admissible. This is a
sensible solution as it would avoid unnecessary proceedings before the ECJ, e.g. in cases
where the ECtHR finds the application manifestly ill-founded. It is suggested here that the
ECtHR should open up the opportunity to involve the ECJ in every admissible case, which the
EU has joined as a co-respondent. It would then be up to the EU’s institutions to decide
whether they should instigate such a review. They might, for instance, decide not to do so
where the ECJ has already found in unrelated proceedings that a piece of legislation is
compatible with the EU’s fundamental rights. This would avoid a complicated assessment by
the ECtHR as to whether the ECJ has already pronounced on a question. This assessment
would not always be easy to make since even where the ECJ has made a pronouncement in
the case, it may not have addressed the violation of fundamental rights. Or it may have
addressed fundamental rights but not all rights the violation of which is argued before the
ECtHR.
b. The procedure before the Court of Justice
The draft does not reveal anything about how and by whom the review before the ECJ is to
be initiated. The previous first draft provided explicitly that it was to be conducted in
accordance with internal rules of the EU.82 There is nothing to suggest that the revised draft
is meant to change this. The reference to internal rules of the Union was intended to avoid a
violation of the autonomy of EU law, which remains a valid objective. If the draft provided
for a specific procedure, this would potentially involve a hidden Treaty amendment and fall
82 Article 4 (3) of the first draft, CDDH-UE(2011)04.
26
foul of the requirements for preserving the autonomy of EU law. Thus the determination of
the procedure before the Court of Justice has been left to the European Union. This
contribution assumes that the EU wants to avoid having to amend the Treaties. Not only
would an amendment potentially trigger referenda in some Member States with an
uncertain outcome but it would hardly be limited to the rather specific technical questions
surrounding an accession of the EU to the ECHR and might thus open a Pandora’s box by
allowing the Member States to re-negotiate the Treaties as a whole.
The question for the EU is therefore which options it has on the basis of the current
Treaties and within the constraints imposed by the autonomy of EU law. In a working
document, the Commission argues that the procedure for the prior involvement of the ECJ
should be similar to the procedure governing the preliminary reference procedure.83 It is
envisaged that such a procedure would be included in the Council decision concluding the
accession treaty.84 The question is whether the introduction of such a procedure would be
in accordance with the autonomy of EU law. The Commission argues that this would be so
pointing to Article 19 TEU, which states that the ECJ ensures ‘that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed’.85 Yet Article 19 TEU does not provide for a
specific procedure before the ECJ, but merely defines the overall role and function of the
ECJ. This means that any procedure suggested would still have to be in accordance with the
procedures existent at the moment.
The most plausible solution would be to allow the European Commission to have a
case reviewed by the ECJ. The European Commission would be the natural institution to be
in charge of this since it would be the institution representing the EU before the ECtHR and
would thus be familiar with the case. The initiation of judicial review would be a power
which the Commission already has under Article 263 (2) TFEU. Thus an extension of this
power would at first glance not conflict with the autonomy of EU law. But closer scrutiny
reveals that this question cannot be answered that easily.
The first issue is whether the Commission should be under an obligation to instigate
such proceedings. This would necessitate a Treaty amendment since the instigation of
83 European Commission Working Document DS 1930/10, para 5.
84 Ibid para 10.
85 Ibid para 12.
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proceedings under Article 263 TFEU is within the discretion of the Commission.86 Thus as far
as EU law is concerned the initiation of proceedings would have to remain in the discretion
of the Commission. This would have the advantage of giving the Commission an opportunity
to assess whether such proceedings are necessary. Where the Court of Justice has already
made pronouncements on the compatibility with fundamental rights, the Commission could
choose not to instigate them. The Commission would thus be in a position to exercise a
filter function, which would chime with its role as the guardian of the Treaties. If the
Commission failed to bring the case before the ECJ, the ECtHR would decide without a prior
involvement of that Court. This would not be problematic since, as already indicated, the
prior involvement of the ECJ is not necessary in order to preserve the autonomy of EU law.
The main reason for it is to give the EU courts a possibility to remedy a violation and thus to
avoid a conviction. Where the EU Commission decides not to introduce proceedings, one
can assume that the EU does not have an interest in being given the opportunity to remedy
the violation and thus the ECtHR would be able to find such violation without prior
involvement of the ECJ.
There is, however, the problem of the strict time limit contained in Article 263 (6)
TFEU, which provides that proceedings must be instituted within two months of the
publication of the legal act in question. By the time proceedings have reached the ECtHR,
this two month period will inevitably have expired. The question would therefore be
whether the accession agreement could rely on the procedure under Article 263 TFEU in
spite of the time limit. The autonomy of EU law would only be an obstacle if the nature of
the ECJ’s functions were affected. Thus one needs to ask whether this would constitute an
alteration of the competence of the Court, which is comparable to the extension of the
preliminary reference procedure to the courts of the EFTA states in Opinion 1/91. It is
recalled that the Court did not accept this because the answer provided by the ECJ was not
to be binding.87 It is argued here that the dispensation with the time limit contained in
Article 263 TFEU would not lead to a comparable change in the nature of the function of the
ECJ. The main reason for the time limit in Article 263 (6) TFEU is legal certainty. Acts by the
Union’s institutions should not be subject to judicial review after a certain amount of time
has passed. The provision is best understood when read in conjunction with applications
86 ECJ, Case 247/87 Star Fruit v Commission [1989] ECR 291.
87 Opinion 1/91, para 61.
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under Article 263 (4) TFEU concerning acts addressed to the individual claimant. It is
recalled that the Lisbon Treaty amended the wording of Article 263 (4) TFEU. Previously, an
applicant was only able to challenge decisions. Acts formally passed as regulations were
only challengeable if they were of direct and individual concern to the applicant and in
substance had to be deemed decisions.88 Decisions are executive acts which are confined to
a specific situation and only affect the addressee. A time limit is justifiable in such situations
since the applicant was personally informed of the decision. There is an interest on part of
the EU and in the name of legal certainty that an act of this kind is not forever challengeable
so that the demand for legal certainty in such situations prevails over the individual’s
interest in legality.
The same time limit is in principle applicable in preliminary reference procedures
concerning the validity of such acts.89 The leading decision is Textilwerke Deggendorf.90 The
case concerned a Commission decision addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany
declaring that state aid granted to Textilwerke Deggendorf was unlawful under the Treaties.
The national court made a preliminary reference concerning the legality of the Commission’s
decision after the time limit for an individual application had long expired. The ECJ argued
that a decision not challenged under Article 263 TFEU becomes definite against the
addressee.91 The reason was to safeguard legal certainty.92 Despite having been pointed to
the possibility of challenging the Commission’s decision by the national authorities under
Article 263 (4) TFEU, Textilwerke Deggendorf failed to do so and challenged domestic
decisions revoking the aid in the domestic courts instead. Its challenge was unsuccessful
since the time limit contained in Article263 (6) TFEU had expired. The Nachi case confirms
these findings with regard to anti-dumping regulations.93 The Court’s reasoning in this
respect is convincing when it points to the dual nature of anti-dumping regulations. They
are not only formally legislative acts but at the same time affect an individual directly and
individually. For the individual they are therefore equivalent to decisions so that the
application of the time limit is justified.94 At the same time it can be deduced from Nachi
88 Article 230 (4) TEC.
89 Wegener in: Calliess/Ruffert, EUV/EGV, 3rd edn., Art. 234 EGV, para 14.
90 Case C-188/92 Textilwerke Deggendorf [1994] ECR I-833.
91 Ibid, para 13.
92 Ibid, para 16.
93 Case C-239/99 Nachi Europe [2001] ECR I-1197.
94 Ibid, paras 36-37.
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that where ‘normal’ legislation is concerned, i.e. an act of general application only, this
rationale would not apply. The Court emphasised that the time limit could only preclude a
review under Article 267 TFEU where the individual had a possibility of challenging an act
under Article 263 (4) TFEU. As Arnull argues, it seems unlikely that the rule would normally
extend to measures of general application.95 This is correct since the situation is different
when it comes to legislative acts. Such acts are applicable erga omnes and are normally of
an unlimited duration. If these acts are incompatible with fundamental rights (or have been
adopted illegally for other reasons) they violate the rights of individuals each time they are
implemented. If they were not challengeable for more than two months after their
adoption, an illegal situation would be perpetuated. Thus the interests involved differ from
those involved when dealing with decisions and there is thus no room for legal certainty to
prevail over legality. This finding is confirmed by the more recent case law of the ECJ which
allows challenges to be brought under Article 267 TFEU where the applicant did not have
standing to bring a case under Article 263 (4) TFEU.96
It follows that the limit in Article 263 (6) TFEU is only applicable to individual
challenges of decisions or regulations in the guise of decisions but not to genuine EU
legislation. The European Court of Justice thus has jurisdiction to review the validity of EU
legislative acts in the absence of a time limit. The introduction of a procedure providing for
review of legislative acts would therefore be possible without a Treaty amendment.
A further point which might prove to be problematic with regard to the autonomy of
EU law is that the draft provides for the EU to ensure that the ruling is delivered quickly.
This clearly addresses a question internal to EU law and might thus constitute a hidden
amendment to the Treaties and be in violation of the autonomy of EU law. However,
Article 23 a of the Statute of the Court already provides for an accelerated procedure before
the Court of Justice. The Statute has the legal status of a Protocol to the Treaties and is
therefore part of EU primary law.97 Thus an accelerated procedure is not alien to the
Treaties as they currently stand. Its introduction in cases envisaged by the draft provision,
would therefore be possible without amending the Treaties, so that the provision would not
95 Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2006), p. 129.
96 E.g. Case C-241/95 Accrington Beef [1996] ECR I-6699; Joined Cases C-346/03 and 529/03 Atzeni and others
[2006] ECR I-1875; in great detail Broberg/Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice,
(Oxford, 2010) pp. 213-222.
97 Cf. Art 281 TFEU and Statute of the Court, OJ 2010 C 83, 210.
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constitute a hidden Treaty amendment. The ECJ would merely have to amend its Rules of
Procedure which in Art 104 a and 104 b allow for an accelerated procedure.
The final question then is whether the ECJ’s review should be limited to violations of
fundamental rights. According to the draft proposal the ECJ is to be given the opportunity to
rule on the conformity of an act with fundamental rights where it has not already done so. It
seems to be the intention of the European Commission to have the ECJ perform a strictly
limited review of the Union act on account of the relevant fundamental right.98 The
Commission’s aim is clear: such a limited review would allow the ECJ to decide quickly so
that proceedings before the ECtHR would not be unduly delayed. A further argument for
restricting the ECJ’s jurisdiction would be that the proceedings before it would mirror the
test to be carried out by the ECtHR. However, there is currently no purely fundamental
rights review under EU law. Articles 263 and 267 TFEU are not limited to a review of
compatibility with fundamental rights but are more general reviews of legality. The content
of the questions is not limited so long as they concern the compatibility of EU legislation
with primary law. The wording of Article 267 TFEU limits the ECJ to answering the questions
referred to it. This would suggest that the Commission could limit its request, too. But this
would alter the nature of the Commission’s right to have legislation reviewed by the ECJ and
would thus be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order. Under Article 263
TFEU such a limitation is not possible. The Commission would therefore be granted a new
right of limiting the ECJ’s jurisdiction on the matter, which would amount to a Treaty
amendment. It is moreover suggested that in light of the ECJ’s practice of re-formulating the
questions posed under Article 267 TFEU and its practice of deciding the questions on the
basis of other provision than those referred to it by the national court99, a limitation of its
jurisdiction might not have great effect. Moreover, if the ECJ found that the act was invalid
for other reasons, this would still help to remove the alleged violation of fundamental rights
and make a review by the ECtHR superfluous. It would therefore be within the purpose of
the prior involvement of the ECJ, which is to highlight the subsidiarity of the review carried
out by the ECtHR.
98 European Commission Working Document DS 1930/10, para 9.
99 E.g. Cases C-280/91 Viessmann [1993] ECR I-973, para 17; C-234/01 Gerritse [2003] ECR I-5933, paras 23-24.
On this case law in general: Broberg/Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice, (Oxford
2010) pp. 403 et seq.
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c. Consequences of a decision by the ECJ
The third sentence of the draft provides that the procedure before the ECtHR takes
into account the proceedings before the ECJ. This provision refers to the procedural effect
of proceedings being instigated in the ECJ. The ECtHR would normally wait for the ECJ to
have decided in the matter before rendering its own decision.100 Apart from that the draft
avoids any further pronouncements on what consequences the ECJ’s involvement might
have on the case pending before the ECtHR. Proceedings before the ECJ on the validity of
legislation can have two possible outcomes. Either the ECJ declares the act not to be in
conformity with fundamental rights, which renders it invalid, or the ECJ does not find a
violation and the act continues to be good law. Where the ECJ does not find a violation, the
ECtHR will have to engage with the case and proceed to make a pronouncement on its
merits.
Where an act is declared invalid, the legal basis for the implementing action by the
national authorities of the respondent Member State must be deemed to never have
existed,101 which renders their implementing action illegal (unless there are national rules in
place to the same effect). The question is whether the ECtHR may take this into account as
depriving the applicant of her victim status. According to Article 34 ECHR only persons
claiming to be the victim of a violation of the Convention can file an admissible application.
In proceedings before the ECtHR an applicant loses their victim status where the violation is
removed.102 However, the situation would be more complicated here since the ECJ’s
declaration does not in principle affect the decisions of the domestic courts, which are now
res judicata and can therefore be enforced in the Member State. An instructive parallel can
be drawn to a situation where a provision of national law has been revoked after an
applicant has been convicted on its basis. This was the case before the European
Commission of Human Rights,103 which decided that the applicant had lost his victim status
not simply because the legislation had been revoked but because the court decisions had
been quashed, too. In line with this reasoning I would argue that the applicant would
remain a victim for as long as the decision affecting her has not officially been annulled by
100 Cf.explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)05, para 68.
101 The ECJ’s declaration has retroactive effect, cf. ECJ joined cases 97, 193, 99 and 215/86 Asteris [1988] ECR
2181, para 30.
102 Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Art. 34, 3rd ed., (Kehl 2010), para 32.
103 Sert v Turkey, no 17598/90, 1 April 1992.
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the national authorities.104 If the national authorities do not react, the proceedings before
the Court of Human Rights would have to be continued. The question then would be
whether the ECtHR should be allowed to find a violation of the Convention without further
investigation, which would in effect lead to the ECtHR being bound by the decision of the
ECJ. This, however, might challenge the ECtHR’s role as the ultimate interpreter of the
Convention. In addition, it must be borne in mind that the ECJ would not only apply the
fundamental rights found in the ECHR but it would apply the EU’s fundamental rights as laid
down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and as they exist as general principles of EU law.
This is affirmed by Article 52 (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides that
the Union may provide more extensive protection than that required by the ECHR. If the
ECtHR were simply to follow the ECJ’s assessment, it would risk overstepping its own
jurisdiction as it is limited to decide on violations of the rights laid down in the Convention
and in the Protocols by which the parties to the dispute are bound. Furthermore, there
would be a danger of creating new case law, which domestic courts of parties to the
Convention and even the ECtHR itself might rely upon in the future even though that case
law is not fully attributable to the ECtHR. Thus the ECtHR should come to an independent
decision.
V. Conclusion
This contribution shows that the accession of the EU to the ECHR raises fundamental
questions of constitutional significance. The task of drafting an accession agreement which
would get a green light from the ECJ requires a difficult balancing act between the task of
preserving the autonomy of the EU legal order and practical and political demands, which
might conflict with it. The introduction of the co-respondent mechanism is to be welcomed
as a way of avoiding such conflict. However, the danger is that this mechanism is becoming
so complex that well-intended solutions create new problems in this respect. The prior
involvement of the ECJ, which in the eyes of this author is not required by the autonomy of
the EU’s legal order, is a case in point. Equally importantly, the drafters ought to bear in
mind that the overall aim of the accession is to improve the fundamental rights protection
for individuals. This implies that any solution found must not render this protection too
difficult to obtain. There is a danger that a political compromise might obstruct a legally
104 A similar argument is made in the explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)05, para 66.
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clear solution, which would allow for an effective and speedy protection of individual
fundamental rights.
